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Infraestruturas de Portugal – Merger between REFER & Estradas de Portugal 
 
“The merger between REFER and Estradas de Portugal has a face, and I, António 
Ramalho, am the face of the merger.” [1]. 
 
The ongoing deficits that REFER and Estradas de Portugal have presented in the past, 
created a huge financial problem for the Portuguese economy. In April, 2014, through the 
approval of the plan PETI3+1, the Portuguese Government performed several structural reforms 
in the Infrastructure and Transport sector, to be implemented until 2020. The merger between 
REFER and EP, resulted from those reforms, and, in 2015, Infraestruturas de Portugal was 
formally founded, completing a process started by the Comissão de Planeamento da Fusão. 
However, “mergers do not automatically generate success” [2], often due to an 
ineffective pre-merger phase. This phase, typically focuses on financial factors and so, cultural 
factors are often forgotten as the merger unfolds, affecting its performance. “It is amazing how 
much time and money companies spend on this problem, after it occurs, when they could have 
eliminated it with a pre-merger planning” [3]. Moreover, IP has brought together, two 
companies with different stages of development2, different mobility models, their level of 
sustainability was unequal, and also, their cultures was distinct. For this reason, the pre-merger 
phase did not have a friendly start and was not assumed by several agents from both sides, 
resulting in different levels of engagement [4]. Then, two fundamental issues on this case are, 
to figure out if the resistance by the stakeholders from REFER and EP was similar and if 
employees feel that are, already, represented by a completely new identity? 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Plano Estratégico dos Transportes e Infraestruturas [5]. 
2 REFER was the “poor relative” because it represented less than what it should, mainly in the “port interland” 
capacity that Portugal has and also, its market share of commodities was small [6]. 
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REFER3: was created in 1997, in a spin-off from Comboios de Portugal, becoming the state-
owned company accountable for the management of the Portuguese railway infrastructure. In 
2008, it became a public business entity, with administrative and financial autonomy [7]. 
 
Estradas de Portugal: Before EP, Junta Autónoma das Estradas was founded in 1927. Years 
later, EP was created and became one of the most important institutions of public administration 
in Portugal, until its conversion into a public business entity at the end of 2004. In 2007, turned 
into a joint-stock company, implementing a new management and investment model [8]. 
 
REFER and EP had similarities such as managing transport infrastructures; structures with 
more than 1000 employees and their organizations were characterized by successive statutory 
changes. Anyway, their cultures were different [6]: 
1.!EP was a gender-balanced company4, while in REFER, from its 2,512 employees, the majority 
were men, due to the nature of its operational activity, characterized by high physical demands; 
2.! In EP, between 60%-65% of employees had a bachelor degree. The value fell to 18% in REFER, 
representing a more undifferentiated work in the railway company; 
3.! In terms of labour union influence, REFER was highly unionized (65%), and in EP, there were 
only a few unionized workers; 
4.!EP had a daily infrastructure management unrelated to any road operator. In REFER, there was 
a propensity to look for the infrastructure and transport operation in an integrated way; 
5.! In REFER, the operation control centre performed a complete control of the train circulation5. 
This made the operation more demanding in terms of service level requirements, than EP. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Rede Ferroviária Nacional 
4 In 2014, 56% of the 1,022 employees were male, compared to 44% of the female population [6]. 
5 If there was a train that goes beyond a speed restriction, the system triggers and the information was immediately 
received in the centre [9].!
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Infraestruturas de Portugal: The company that came to “shake” the transport sector  
The former models of REFER and EP have presented poor economic results, proving 
that they were not sustainable6. A new model of management and investment was needed and 
so, on June 1st, 2015, after went through a complex process, led by António Ramalho7, IP was 
created. Headquartered in Almada, IP is a state-owned company in the form of a joint-stock8 
and resulted from the merger between two of the largest state-owned companies in Portugal, 
REFER and EP. It became one of the organizations with more influence in the management of 
the Portuguese geographic space9, named as the interland [10]. In 2016, IP had 3,759 employees 
and António Laranjo was the President of the Board of Directors [11]. 
IP is the result of what can be defined as a horizontal merger, where companies in the 
same industry merge [12]. The model of merging a road and a railway company had already 
been developed in Sweden and Finland, but it is not the same as in Portugal. In the Nordic 
countries, it is a General-Direction of the State. The difference is related with process planning 
and then the ability to execute it. When we talk about a General-Direction of the State, it is the 
State that assumes the functions of planning and execution of the infrastructure management. 
In Portugal, the State has the function of planning, and then, it is up to IP to operationalize this 
planning. Moreover, in Sweden and Finland, the State has great power to finance the 
investments, and, therefore, the sustainability of the company is not a problem. In Portugal, 
beyond the objectives of creating a road-rail integrated model and the profitability of its real-
state assets, it is expected that IP be capable to achieve financial sustainability through its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 António Ramalho said "before the merger, if the model of separate companies continued, it would bring to 
Portugal a deficit increase of 7.2 billion euros, in the years after” [6]. 
7 Former President of the Board of Directors of IP. Holds a law degree from Universidade Católica. In 1985, 
completed a postgraduate degree in "International Capital Markets" by the Institute of Finance in Oxford. Years 
later, worked for the Champalimaud Group, where he was responsible for the sale and spin-off of the Group. In 
2004, after working several years in the Banking sector, was hired by the State to design the financial model of 
Alta Velocidade. Then, in 2014, led the merger process between REFER and EP, that created IP, where he became 
President. In 2016, he resigned from the position and became the new CEO of Novo Banco [13]. 
8 The company's social capital is fully subscribed by the State [11]. 
9 In the road infrastructure, IP has a total of 15,099 km and the railway has a total length of 3,621 km [11]. 
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operationalization and with a rigorous management of its funds [14]. Regarding financial 
sustainability, which is a common goal in a merger process [15], in the short term, all the gains 
that IP already have or will have, will not be enough to face the financial deficit that has. For 
example, only the public-private partnerships represent about 1,500M€ per year and then, the 
sale of real-state assets will not be enough to reach a budgetary balance in the coming years. 
The investment funding is being made through the State Budget and IP lives with large annual 
payments, but in the future, the company will have higher revenues10. In addition, the company 
has to find sources of financing11 because, as defended by a member of the financial department 
of IP, “through this integrated model, the company will have better conditions to be financed, 
and then, it is foreseen that in 2029, the company will be financially sustainable”[16]. 
 
Integration Process: Managing Change  
“The lack of an integration team would slow down the integration process” [17]. 
Anyway, in the pre-merger stage, which is one of three stages in a merger process [18], there 
was no team that manage change, but there was a management team of the merger process, the 
Comissão de Planeamento da Fusão12, created in August 2014, to define a strategic plan to 
guide the performance of IP between 2015 and 201713 [14]. Moreover, the team structured the 
merger process into five distinct phases [19] (Exhibit 1) and was composed by 9 axes (Exhibit 
2). The Portuguese Government wanted to bring REFER and EP together, according to a certain 
number of objectives, set up a planning Commission and informed it that was necessary to 
elaborate a plan to achieve those objectives [4]. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The company has its own revenues, such as, tolls that generate €300M per year, the use of railway infrastructure 
generates €100M per year and the contribution of the road service is worth €680M per year [16]. 
11 In IP, successive operations of capital increase carried out in 2015 and 2016 allowed the reduction of the 
financial charges. (in 2015, there was a capital increase of 1.617,3 million euros) [11]. 
12 António Ramalho was the leader of the Comissão de Planeamento da Fusão. 
13 The logic adopted was to have a strategic plan with the duration of 3 years and then it would be renewed. The 
emphasis of the first plan, was to answer to a financial sustainability component, and so, enough changes should 
occur, resulting in a new strategic plan, with other drivers, for the future [14]. 
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In the beginning, the pre-merger stage was initiated by having two completely different 
management teams, one from REFER and the other from EP, each one was composed by their 
Board members. Those teams were responsible to plan the merger process and were maintained 
for 6 months. They followed the change, interpreted its risk factors and also, made weekly 
reports for the directors of both REFER and EP’s Board of Directors, for them, to follow this 
possibility of integration. Then, in the end of 2014, there were nominated some managers from 
those 2 teams, to join the Joint Board (Administração Conjunta), composed with people who 
had the culture of REFER and EP. Finally, in June 2015, IP was set up, becoming a single 
company with a single Board of Directors14. The whole structure was built, with the directions15 
on the first phase, second the departments, and then the employees [4]. 
 
Was Cultural Due Diligence16 implemented? 
It is part of culture, the share of a vision, strategy, values, practises, but also a set of 
traditions. In the current approaches, one of the reasons why merger process fails, has to do 
with cultural integration. For this reason, it is important to position culture management as an 
integral part of the merger integration process. Moreover, although financial elements are more 
easily quantified, companies should make cultural analysis as central as the financial [21]. 
Cultural integration takes time, but it is important that the due diligence process identify the 
extent of the differences in cultures. “The impact of cultural differences on a merger will be 
mediated by the integration strategy adopted, the progress of cultural integration as well as 
managerial actions throughout the merger process” [22]. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 The Board of Directors has autonomy in the performance of its duties, and so, it is defended that it has the first 
and last decision on IP. Nevertheless, by being a State-owned company, sometimes, the planning and execution 
functions, cross their lines. For example, the State is permeable to local power, and this reflects in IP’s key plan, 
which ends up having some obstacles, like when the State Budget captivates some funds from IP [14].   
15 In IP, there was a balanced selection of leaders. 55% of the directors were from REFER, 45% were from EP [6]. 
16 The responsible for the Cultural Due Diligence process has to identify what are the main cultural differences of 
the organizational model, what are the main difficulties and gaps that a merger could integrate at culture level, as 
well as, the reflection of these cultural differences on the behaviour of the various agents [6].!
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“A newly merged organization will not learn during the post-combination phase if it has 
not been engaged in a learning phase from the start” [23]. In the pre-merger stage, there were 
several Due Diligence processes to understand the different areas of REFER and EP. However, 
none of the 9 axes of the Comissão de Planeamento da Fusão, was for culture and then, “there 
was no Cultural Due Diligence” defended a member of the PMO (project management office) 
team. In this merger, the Due Diligence was mainly in terms of financial and contractual area. 
“The primary reason many mergers do not deliver long-term value is because they lack a strong 
cultural integration plan” [24] and so, “management should pay as much attention to cultural 
fit during the pre-merger stage as it does to finance and strategic factors” [25]. The 
responsibility for the delay in the cultural analysis, can be attributed to the strong trade union 
movement, associated with the railroad, where “issues were answered closed to the trade 
unions, in order not to make the railway operation unfeasible” argued a member of the PMO 
team of IP. Therefore, when the systems were integrated, people began to question why the 
whole process is still not working at 100%. The reason was the lack of the culture analysis, 
which was left to be managed later [4]. Anyway, as it was mentioned by a Senior Advisor of 
the Board, "the process leader, has to decide what is more important. If there is pressure to 
reach certain objectives, go ahead and correct cultural analysis as time goes by” [9].  
However, in the absence of a plan to manage culture, the communication area 
compensated it. The goals of the communication plan were to inform about the new business 
model, minimize employee’s anxiety and to communicate the advantages of the change process, 
promoting IP as a sustainable company. The strategy of the communication plan went through 
3 dimensions: facilitate the culture change (the informal meetings between the CEO and the 
management teams and the program of roadshows have facilitated the exchange of views and 
focus on the decentralized structures); promote employer engagement17 (promote a culture of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 In the beginning, as both companies kept Boards, the Comissão de Planemaento da Fusão set up a website to 
provide information about the process, the Intranet (communication channel for the whole company) [26]. 
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commitment, reducing cultural resistance and value relationships) and create conditions for the 
employees to play the role of ambassadors of IP’s brand18, promoting employer branding (the 
new brand of IP was developed, using internal resources) [26]. Although, concerning the pre-
merger communication, it is criticized that “people who got most involved were the first-line 
directors and there was a differentiated involvement in the merger” defended a Senior Advisor 
of the Board [9]. Sometimes, the important is to use a technique, to tell people that this is good, 
for them to join the project [9]. “The mere existence of diversity (…) only creates the potential 
for learning. To exploit this potential, the organization must create mechanisms for such 
learning to take place” [27]. In the end, despite some criticism, the communication plan was 
executed for the entire line of employees19 and as António Ramalho defended, "we have done 
both the work of internal and external communication in an absolutely religious way” [6]. 
 
The identity of Infraestruturas de Portugal 
IP had a pre-determined cultural framework related with its sustainability, with a 
concept of intermodality and with values such as efficiency, security and transparency [6]. “At 
first, there was a great appeal to use the “IP sweater”, because the change of the brand20 was 
extremely internalized as an element of aggregation of the merger process” said a Board 
Member of IP. However, despite the approval of the new brand, if we approach IP’s employees, 
they would still talk about EP or REFER. They worked many years in their former companies, 
so IP does not have much to create something new in the short-term [14]. António Ramalho 
argued that "it is crucial to have a policy of small steps and wait to realize what the vectors of 
IP are” [6]. People have to gradually forget about their origin and to prove this, is the fact that, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 EP and REFER’s brands were relatively new and still inherited characteristics from JAE (Junta Autónoma das 
Estradas) and CP (Comboios de Portugal) [26]. 
19 65% of IP’s managers agreed that employees were informed about the process and the merger’s results [26]. 
20 The brand presentation was held in Entroncamento, in an emblematic place for the railway area - Museu 
Nacional Ferroviário. The name of the region, symbolizes the crossroads of different cultures and employees from 
the railroad and road infrastructure [28]. 
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62% of IP’s managers agreed that there is still a long way to go for IP to be recognized as a 
single entity [26]. Therefore, it can not be said that the former cultures were dissolved and IP 
created a completely new one. The culture of IP is adjusted and so, characteristics of REFER 
and EP can still be identified. Both companies had a centenary history, and then, it is inevitable 
that the “new” culture born through the existing cultures. Goals may be common, but there is 
still, no identity [14]. Anyway, the objective in the long-term is to have an unique culture and 
then, employees will start to feel in the future, that they are represented by a new identity and, 
for this reason, IP is moving through the Metamorphosis path, which is one of the paths to 
achieve identity integration, “which enables members to forget the identity of their original 
companies, developing a shared identity, in which all parties feel they have a voice” [3].  
IP has made unification of cultures/practices to happen. It was mentioned by António 
Ramalho that, “in the departments, where it was decided that cultures should be integrated, 
there was a plan to standardize it” [6]. For this reason, the substantive levers, through which 
managers can shape an organization’s identity, are related to IP, “which refer to acts and 
decisions, not just dialogue. They include decisions regarding governance structure and 
changing organizational structures” [3]. The areas that suffered less with the process of unifying 
cultures were the operational areas, such as the areas of railway and road maintenance, 
circulation management and large investments, because they were different. That is, in the 
maintenance area, teams from REFER and EP remain separate, since in one case it was done 
in-house (REFER), the other was done by contract management (EP)21. Curiously, these areas 
have about 2/3 of IP employees [4]. Regarding this, António Ramalho argued that "merging 
operational areas of the road-rail infrastructure is possible, but I do not think it is an essential 
element for a successful merger”22 [6]. When a merger fails to deliver promised levels of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 In EP there was more use of outsourcing than in REFER.  Road engineering can be practiced in project offices, 
so, there are a number of professionals who could work, not needing to be on Estradas de Portugal [9]. 
22 Beyond economic performance, there were also improvements in operating performance, resulting in growth in 
the number of trips by rail and roadway and reduction of the networks’ maintenance costs [20]. 
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performance it is likely due at least, in part, to a lack of psychological synergies [3]. “We 
assumed that there were cultural differences in certain functions that should be preserved for 
some period", said the former CEO of IP. Nonetheless, for the separate areas, there was an 
informative plan, for them to get informed about what the other team was doing and to 
participate in the same knowledge [6]. “One of the keys to managing the integration process is 
to obtain the participation of the people” [29]. Contrarily, “the areas where the process of 
unifying cultures and practices had a great impact were the shared services and corporate 
services” defended a Board Member of IP, such as, planning, financial, human resources, 
commercial, information systems and asset management23. The centralized services have 
become common services. In addition, the engineering area has also merged, but it was a special 
case. Even doing the same function, road and rail engineering have different specificities. 
Therefore, in some departments, there was not a complete merger [14]. 
Moreover, it was questioned whether it would be necessary to do a renewal of human 
resources24 at the operational level. The people less confident regarding this merger, defended 
that IP has brought together two companies, which worked with specific technical skills and 
so, "no one can jump between areas, but rather stay in a specific area", said a participant in a 
debate [30]. Anyway, regarding this theme, it was concluded that in the operational activities, 
the daily production will always be different, since the areas are separated and then, skills do 
not need to change just because there was a merger. On the other hand, with change and 
organizational component, soft skills are more critical in a merger. For example, for the 
employees from REFER it is difficult to talk about sales. Creating processes for this is what is 
more complex. It is necessary to prepare people to work as a team, because the company is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 A merger process recombines 5 types of asset, such as the physical assets, like facilities [31]. 
24 A company’s human resources practices can be powerful shapers of its culture. These include, among others, 
compensation practices, and messages about values [32]. 
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much bigger25. The required renewal is the same as before the merger. “IP has a more serious 
problem with aging” argued a member of the PMO team. It is not normal to have companies 
and a State that can not hire for more than 10 years. At the moment, in IP, there are almost no 
employees under 30 years [4]. Older people are leaving and there is no renewal. It is essential 
that people be “born” within IP scope [29]. To conclude, all areas where was a unification of 
cultures is where there was a mix of employees. For example, in mixed areas, although 
employees are doing road activity, they have experience that is valid in the railway area, so in 
the internal recruitment process, they are already applying [14]. 
 
"It is good to have some resistance" 
“Change is contrary to our human nature, and we are meant to get into routines” said a 
member of the Board of IP [14]. “The workforce does not always share the same perceptions, 
and culture change becomes a difficult process” [33]. Although, in IP’s merger process, there 
was no acts of manifest, such as strikes, or people refusing proposals for certain functions. 
“Resistance is more within people than it is manifested” defended a member of the PMO [4]. 
When the merger was announced, employees answered, whether they agreed or not. Prior to 
the merger, more than 1,000 workers spoke with Antonio Ramalho, who stated that, "there was 
a significant group of people who was in favour of the merger” [6]. However, there was a 
difference between companies, where REFER’s employees looked less pleased26. The different 
number of unionized workers in both companies can explain this imbalance. Despite this, the 
great reason for resistance was associated with changes in facilities27, changes of management 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 The IP Academy promotes the development of skills considered critical to the business, with a strong focus on 
internal training, involving the whole structure of the group, in alignment with the organizational objectives. It 
seeks to integrate people and train at a certain level through association with Universities. It was something that 
was already working more in REFER than in EP, and was transferred to IP [6]. 
26 In EP, 45% of the people questioned, found the merger an important step and an opportunity for their careers. 
Regarding Refer, it was 27% [4]. 
27 36% of managers made an unfavourable assessment about the change of facilities. Nevertheless, a methodology 
was developed to minimize the effects of this situation [26]. 
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and changes in work processes, because IP had to adopt one of the two sides28. There is still a 
little of "us and them" between employees [4].  “Organization members show a positive bias 
toward members of their own in-group and tend to hold a negative view of the members of an 
out-group”29 [34]. REFER and EP had different sizes, in terms, of number of workers, which 
implied a different approach to the business. In addition, there were also language issues, as 
each area has its own technical language, where certain things have different names [4]. 
Moreover, there is also, some resistance regarding the different remuneration levels. “People 
who perform similar functions are gaining different values”, defended a Senior Advisor of IP 
[9]. “Despite all the efforts, these differences will not fade, but it has been an issue that has not 
created big problems” argued a member of the financial department of IP [16]. 
In a merger, a crucial aspect is stability. Even when opinions are different, it is important 
to not always be in a process of rupture, “because usually companies, like REFER and EP, 
change the Board and employees enter in a process of uncertainty” defended a Senior Advisor 
of IP [9]. Anyway, in the beginning, the merger was led by António Ramalho and meanwhile, 
there was a replace of Government, which changed the area of infrastructures. Moreover, there 
was also a change in the company’s strategy, because the pre-merger focus is different from the 
post-merger, due to the fact that, in the later phase IP is materializing the investment. More 
ahead, the new Government continues and the President of IP changed. “Although the style of 
António Ramalho is different from António Laranjo’s style, the project continued” said a 
member of the PMO. However this merger was opposed by the left-wing parties, which 
defended a return to the former model in rail network30, we can say that, from the political view, 
there has been a consensus [14]. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 IP work with SAP software, which was the system that was on the side of REFER and not the Oracle system 
that was on the side of EP, which led the REFER culture to be dominant in accounting [6]. 
29 IP’s managers considered that organizational climate and engagement of employees is more favourable inside 
departments and decreases between departments and in IP as a whole [26]. 
30 In the past, there was no separation between transport operator and infrastructure (REFER and CP). 
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After all, have the different cultures had impact? 
Portugal will only be competitive in its services if it has an infrastructure network that 
allows a low level of transport costs, and this can only be achieved if the networks are 
integrated. In a country with scarce resources, it is fundamental to realize where things can be 
complementary [14]. With the merger, there was a reduction of costs, but these costs were 
secondary, in relation to the most relevant value, which was the decision about the investment 
model of not being competitive between road and rail infrastructure, but complementary [6]. 
To say that, after the merger, this is already possible, it is not true. It was defended by a Senior 
Advisor of IP that, "in the immediate terms, the most tangible objectives may have been 
achieved, but the structural issues associated with a merger, like the, financial sustainability in 
the long term, it is still too early to analyse” [9]. The values that are associated with the merger 
are still not significant, representing a value around € 30M until 201931. However, with the 
integrated model, IP was able to position itself differently from its suppliers, but is this a result 
from the merger, or from a management capacity? It will be difficult to know. “The merger was 
an option, but not the only one” defended a member of the financial department [16]. The value 
that the merger can bring to the shareholder and to the economy, only the future can determine 
and as António Ramalho stated, “the country would lose in reversing the merger process 
because we have an opportunity for all mobility to be treated in an intelligently way, (…) ensure 
the growth of rail traffic, maintain the quality of the road sector, and simultaneously create 
conditions so that everything can be done without burdening the State Budget” [10]. 
On the other hand, when cultural analysis was supposed to be executed, the priority to 
invest in a close relationship with labour unions, made Cultural Due Diligence to be postponed 
[14]. The communication department was the option to counterbalance the lack of culture 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 There was a reduction of directors, which occurred directly from the merger. At this point, in 5 years, there will 
be a saving of around € 10M. In relation, to the value of the employees who left, there was a gain of € 20M, but it 
can not be all imputed to the merger. Then there are the gains related to the profitability of real estate assets, 
because there was a concentration of people in certain buildings [16]. 
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analysis. Only after Infraestruturas de Portugal was established, the company intensified the 
process of cultural integration. While managers were concerned about managing the financial 
and operational issues of the integration, they delayed the rigors of managing culture clash, 
ignoring cultural differences or assumed that the combining cultures were similar. In its first 
two years, IP has shown positive economic results32 and 57% of the managers agreed in part 
that the merger process was efficient [26], but nevertheless, it is important to question, if 
cultural Due Diligence was done in the pre-merger stage, would the economic performance be 
higher? Anyway, this first positive economic results “protect” what managers defended in the 
first six months since IP was established, that the inter-relationship between employees was 
more favourable inside departments but decreases between departments and in IP as a whole. 
Therefore, in departments such as maintenance, who kept separated, the change process from 
the former cultures to the new IP culture can be slower, than in departments that are already 
merged, where employees from different background work together. Then, the future will 
answer if the lack of cultural analysis in the pre-merger stage will only be noted in a later period, 
increasing the low resistance that already existed, or is this merger a special case, where the 









32 In 2015, the Net Result was positive, in the amount of 12.5 million euros, representing a significant improvement 
of 85 million euros, compared to the combined negative result of EP and REFER in 2014. In the 1st half of 2016, 
the Net Result was positive: 5.1 million euros. This value represented an increase over the homologous period, 
which had a negative Net Result of 12.3 million euros [11]. 
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EXHIBIT 1: 5 Stages of Comissão de Planeamento da Fusão 
 

















EXHIBIT 2: Comissão de Planeamento da Fusão – 9 axes 
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Pedagogical objectives of the case: 
This case describes how Infraestruturas de Portugal, the company responsible for 
managing the road-rail infrastructure in Portugal, has been able to integrate two different 
cultures. IP resulted from the merger between REFER and Estradas de Portugal, former public 
companies responsible for railway and road infrastructure, respectively, which had different 
stages of development, different mobility models, their level of sustainability was unequal, and 
also, their structure of cultures was distinct. Therefore, the pre-merger phase did not have a 
friendly start and was not assumed by several agents from both sides, resulting in different 
levels of engagement. It is fundamental to have a cultural integration process well planned and 
executed, with the objective of not failing the business. The objectives are: 
1.! Describe two models of merging a rail and a road infrastructure; 
2.! Describe the objectives of merging a rail and a road infrastructures companies; 
3.! To position and understand the role that the "organizational culture" has in a merger 
process and in the creation of a new entity; 
a.! One of the reasons why merger process fails, has to do with cultural integration. 
Due Diligence process typically focuses on financial factors, then it is important 
to analyse if culture should be part of the integration process; 
b.! Analyse the causes of resistance by stakeholders about the merger process, the 
differences between each party and what criticism was made by the opposition; 
c.! Figure out what is the relation between the new and former cultures. For this 
reason, it is important to examine in which of the four distinct paths that can be 
followed to achieve culture/identity integration, did the company went through; 
d.! Describe in what departments are common to unify cultures and, for this reason, 
prove that an integration of a culture is different between departments. 
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The main take-aways that should result from the discussion in class are: 
1.! In terms of pre-merger stage, it is important to pay attention to non-financial variables. 
Factors such as the integration strategy, cultural differences, the communication and 
learning processes are as important as the financial factors. To have an effective merger, 
managers must analyse both the financial and psychological synergies. For the 
psychological synergies to happen, executives need to make a set of identity issues; 
2.! Bringing together people from different entities involves finding common objectives to 
create unity, a key step towards building a new identity. The organization must create 
mechanisms for learning; 
3.! Identity is shaped and reinforced by all the organization’s key stakeholders. Also, 
managers should know that, in contrast to operational alignment, identity alignment is 
a process that can take years. This time is represented in the case, where, even with the 
objective of having a unique culture, there is still the presence of the former cultures; 
4.! Each entity has a single culture and so, each one involved in a merger process, faces 
culture clash, which can be found even in mergers where both companies are based in 
the same country and in the same sector. Moreover, even if the merger decision is 
unanimously accepted, some stakeholders resist to a major change. Anyway, resistance 
may be attenuated if employees within an organization are treated well and then 
commitment to the organization is a probable outcome. 
 
Review of the relevant academic literature 
The theme of culture in a merger process is studied and integrated in the main books of 
Mergers & Acquisitions and in Human Resources. In addition, there are also certain articles 
that study the presence of culture in a merger process and the relevance of a cultural due 
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diligence in a pre-merger stage. This work project aims to relate the presence of culture in a 
real merger process, between two organizations that had different culture structures.  
To complement the interviews made to members of the company structure and the use 
of official documents of IP, my primary sources were books such as Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Managing Culture and Human Resources, Applied Mergers & Acquisitions, Handbook of 
Research on Mergers and Acquisitions and Managing Culture Clashes in M&A’s. I also 
resorted to articles such as “Making Mergers Work” and “A framework for the human resources 
role in managing culture in mergers and acquisitions”: 
1.! Integration Process: it should be on the hands of top management teams whose role is to 
make strategic decisions. In terms of integration process, I referred to (Laeser 2014) in 
“Managing Culture Clashes in M&A’s”, which refers the relevance of the work of an 
integration team, which should bring intercultural competences with them to be able to fulfil 
future integration tasks. Effective integration means employee satisfaction through 
developing constructive employee behaviour, building a new identity, and reduce the 
cultural and communications problems; 
2.!Resistance: in terms of resistance between employees from different organizations, I 
referred to (Weber 2012) in “Handbook of Research on Mergers and Acquisitions” about 
the social identity theory, which studied that it is normal that people who came from the 
same organization tend to get well with the former colleagues, but, on the other side, 
sometimes, hold a negative view of the members of an out-group. In addition, I referred to 
(Cartwright and Cooper 1996) in Managing Mergers, Acquisitions and Strategic Alliances: 
Integrating People and Cultures which exams the different perceptions that the workforce 
have and so, culture changes becomes a complex process.!!
3.!Cultural Due Diligence: in “National and corporate cultural fit in Mergers/Acquisitions: an 
exploratory study” by (Weber and Shenkar and Raveh, 1996) it is analysed the importance 
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of the presence of a cultural due diligence process in a pre-merger phase and the needed 
balance between financial and cultural analysis, for fear of undermining synergies. It is 
concluded that, only after a cultural problem appears, the managers start to work on the 
theme. Moreover, in “Making the most in culture clash in M&A” by (Marks and Mirvis and 
Ashkenas, 2013) it is examined the fact that while managers are preoccupied managing the 
financial aspects of integration, they postpone the culture integration. 
4.! Identity Integration: the definition of an identity makes an organization unique. In the MIT 
Sloan Management Review’s article, “Making Mergers Work”, it is analysed the four 
distinct paths that can be followed to achieve identity integration, such as assimilation, 
confederation, federation and metamorphosis. Each represents “a particular combination of 
the answers to questions that managers must answer in pre-merger such as, how should a 
common identity be built?”. In addition, it is analysed that “managers can shape an 
organization’s identity through the use of two different levers: symbolic and substantive”. 
The symbolic identity management lever “consist of discourse about what the merged 
organization stands for” and substantive lever “refers to acts and decisions about the 
organization, not just discourse”. 
5.!Cultural Differences: this theme is analysed in “The Culture–Performance Relationship in 
M&A: From yes/no to how” by (Teerikangas and Very 2006), which analysed the impact of 
cultural differences between entities in the performance of a merger and “it will be mediated 
by the integration strategy adopted, the progress of cultural integration as well as managerial 






Road map for discussion 
 
1.! “A newly merged organization will not learn during the post-combination phase if 
it has not been engaged in a learning process from the start”35. Did IP performed 
cultural Due Diligence in the pre-merger phase? 
In the pre-merger stage, there were several Due Diligence processes to understand the 
different areas of REFER and EP. However, the Due Diligence process was mainly in 
terms of financial area and so, at start there was no cultural Due Diligence. The 
responsibility for the delay in the cultural analysis, can be attributed to the strong trade 
union movement, associated with the railroad, where issues were answered closed to the 
trade unions, in order not to make the railway operation unfeasible. 
2.! What did the company structure to attenuate the lack of cultural Due Diligence? 
The communication area was the option to attenuate the lack of cultural Due Diligence. 
The objectives were to inform employees about the new business model, minimize 
employee’s anxiety and to communicate the advantages of the change process. 
3.! “One of the keys to managing the integration process is to obtain the participation 
of the people”36. Did IP’s employees had a role in the integration process? 
The strategy of the communication plan went through 3 dimensions, and one of them 
was to promote employer branding, creating conditions for employees to play the role 
of ambassadors of IP’s brand. For example, the new brand of IP was developed, using 




35[23] Stahl, Gunter K., and Mendenhall, Mark E. 2005. Mergers and Acquisitions: Managing Culture and Human 
Resources, 78. Stanford University Press. 
36[29] Haspelagh, Philippe, and Jemison, David. 1991. Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value Through Corporate 
Renewal. Free Press. 
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4.! There are four distinct paths to achieve identity integration: Assimilation, 
Confederation, Federation and Metamorphosis. Which one is more related to IP’s? 
The culture of IP is adjusted and so, characteristics of REFER and EP can still be 
identified. Both companies had a centenary history, and then, it is inevitable that the 
“new” culture born through the existing cultures. Anyway, the objective is to have, in 
the long-term, a unique culture and so, employees will start to feel they are represented 
by a new identity and, for this reason IP is moving through the Metamorphosis path, 
which enables members to forget the identity of their original companies, permitting the 
development of a shared identity, in which all parties ideally feel they have a voice. 
5.! The percentage of employees from REFER and EP that were in favour about the 
merger, was equal? And what are the main reasons for the existence of resistance? 
There was a difference in resistance, where REFER’s employees looked less pleased. 
In EP, 45% of the people questioned, found the merger an important step and an 
opportunity for their careers. Regarding Refer, it was 27%. The different number of 
unionized workers in both companies can explain this imbalance. Despite this, the great 
reason for resistance was associated with changes in facilities, changes of management 
and changes in work processes, because IP had to adopt one of the two sides. 
6.! “Organization members show a positive bias toward members of their own in-
group and tend to hold a negative view of the members of an out-group”37. How is 
the relationship between employees? 
In IP, some areas merged (financial area, human resources, marketing) and other areas 
kept separated (road and rail maintenance). Then, IP’s managers consider that the 
organizational climate and engagement of employees is more favourable inside 
departments and decreases between departments and in IP as a whole. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 [34] Weber, Yaakov. 2012. Handbook of Research on Mergers and Acquisitions, 69. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
